OpenAI disrupts Russian and Iranian disinformation campaigns infiltrating media outlets
OpenAI has disrupted two geopolitical influence operations—one Russian, one Iranian—that used fake identities to plant disinformation in legitimate news outlets. Unlike traditional social media campaigns, these operations targeted regions like Latin America and exploited gaps in media verification processes, triggering official denials and fact-checks.
Editor, Lazyfounder
30 SEC SUMMARY
- OpenAI disrupted Russian and Iranian influence operations using AI tools to plant disinformation in legitimate media outlets.
- The Russian operation, "Dark Clark," targeted Latin America to discredit Ukraine and destabilize local politics.
- The Iranian operation, "Bogus Bylines," placed nearly 100 articles in global outlets using fake journalist identities.
- Both operations used ChatGPT for internal reporting and language adaptation, not direct public dissemination.
- Fabricated content from these operations triggered fact-checks and official denials in countries like Ecuador and Peru.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
KEY HIGHLIGHTS
- OpenAI identified and disrupted two influence operations: Russian-led "Dark Clark" and Iranian-led "Bogus Bylines."
- These operations used fake identities to place disinformation in legitimate news outlets, rather than relying on social media campaigns.
- "Dark Clark" targeted Latin America, generating fabricated content that led to official denials and fact-checks in Ecuador and Peru.
- "Bogus Bylines" involved seven fake journalists who placed nearly 100 articles about the US-Iran conflict in global online outlets.
- Both operations used ChatGPT for internal reporting and adapting propaganda to different languages.
What OpenAI uncovered
OpenAI reported disrupting two influence operations: one linked to Russia, named "Dark Clark," and another linked to Iran, called "Bogus Bylines." Both operations used fake identities to plant disinformation in legitimate news outlets, rather than relying on social media campaigns, according to The Decoder.
The Russian operation, "Dark Clark," focused on Latin America, spreading content aimed at discrediting Ukraine and destabilizing local politics. OpenAI categorized this operation as level 5 out of 6 on its Breakout Scale, noting that politicians in the region reacted to the fabricated content.
The Iranian operation, "Bogus Bylines," involved seven fake journalist identities that placed nearly 100 articles about the US-Iran conflict in global online outlets. While these articles were published, they garnered minimal engagement, and attempts to amplify them via social media comments failed to gain traction.
How these operations worked
According to The Decoder, the actors behind "Dark Clark" controlled a think tank through a fictitious persona and likely involved local staffers without their knowledge. The operation generated fabricated audio files and documents, some of which triggered fact-checks and official denials in Ecuador and Peru.
Both operations used OpenAI’s ChatGPT for internal reporting and adapting propaganda to different languages, rather than generating the disinformation itself. This suggests a tactical shift in how AI tools are deployed in influence campaigns—less for creating content, more for logistical support.
OpenAI had previously uncovered a separate Russian campaign that relied on social media and a fake think tank. The pivot to planting content in legitimate media outlets may reflect a response to growing scrutiny of social media-based disinformation.
Why traditional media outlets were targeted
The shift from social media to legitimate outlets indicates an evolution in influence operations. While social media campaigns are easier to detect and disrupt, planting disinformation in established media outlets lends it an air of credibility, even if the content is later debunked.
For operators in media and cybersecurity, this highlights the need for stronger verification processes for contributors, particularly in regions prone to geopolitical influence campaigns. The fact that fabricated content led to official denials in Ecuador and Peru shows how even low-effort operations can achieve real-world impact.
What this means
Lazyfounder analysis — our interpretation, not reported fact.
This story underscores how AI tools—originally designed to assist with productivity—are being co-opted for geopolitical influence operations. For founders and operators, the takeaway isn’t just about the misuse of technology but the shifting tactics of disinformation campaigns. Unlike traditional social media-based propaganda, these operations are infiltrating legitimate media outlets, which could erode trust in institutions over time.
For startups in AI, media, and cybersecurity, this is a call to build robust detection mechanisms. The fact that fabricated content triggered real-world reactions (like official denials) shows how even clumsy operations can create ripple effects. On the flip side, it’s a reminder that AI’s role in these campaigns is still supplementary—human oversight remains critical in both perpetrating and countering disinformation.
Key takeaways
- AI tools like ChatGPT are being repurposed for influence operations, even if not directly used to generate public-facing disinformation.
- Legitimate media outlets remain vulnerable to infiltration by fake identities, amplifying geopolitical propaganda.
- Founders in media, cybersecurity, and AI must prioritize verification systems to detect fabricated content and identities.
- Geopolitical disinformation campaigns are evolving beyond social media, requiring broader industry vigilance.
- Operations like these can trigger real-world consequences, such as official denials and fact-checks, even if their reach remains limited.
FAQ
Did OpenAI’s tools generate the disinformation itself?
No. According to OpenAI, both operations used ChatGPT for internal reporting and adapting propaganda to different languages, not for creating the disinformation content directly.
What was the goal of the "Dark Clark" operation?
The "Dark Clark" operation aimed to discredit Ukraine and destabilize local politics in Latin America by planting fabricated content in legitimate media outlets.
How successful were these operations?
While "Dark Clark" triggered fact-checks and official denials in Ecuador and Peru, OpenAI rated it as level 5 out of 6 on its Breakout Scale, indicating limited but measurable impact. The Iranian operation, "Bogus Bylines," placed nearly 100 articles but gained little traction.
Related on Lazyfounder
Sources
- The Decoder · 2026-10-09
OpenAI uncovers Russian and Iranian influence ops that planted fake stories in real news outlets
This story is an original summary drafted with AI by Lazyfounder from the reporting listed above and checked by automated validation. Facts are attributed to their original publishers; sections marked as analysis are Lazyfounder's. Where a source is in another language, facts were machine-translated and quotations are reported, not reproduced. Read the original coverage via the links, and see our AI policy and corrections policy.
About the author
Editor, Lazyfounder
Tarun Mottlia edits LazyFounders, covering Indian startups, funding rounds, AI and product launches. Every story on the site is AI-assisted and checked against its cited sources before publication.
More stories by Tarun MottliaGet the LazyFounder Brief
Startup, funding and AI news in a five-minute read. Join the early-access list.
